Most Recent The SecOps Group CAP Exam Dumps

Google Dorks are advanced search operators used to find specific information or vulnerabilities on the web. Directory listing vulnerabilities occur when a web server exposes the contents of a directory (e.g., file names, paths) due to misconfiguration. The operators intitle: and intext: are used to search for specific terms in the title or body of web pages, respectively, combined with site: to limit the search to a specific domain.

Option A ('intitle:'Index of' site:victim-app.com'): Correct, as intitle:'Index of' targets pages with 'Index of' in the title, a common indicator of directory listings, and site:victim-app.com restricts the search to that domain.

Option B ('intext:'Index of' site:victim-app.com'): Correct, as intext:'Index of' searches for 'Index of' within the page content, another reliable indicator of directory listings, combined with the domain restriction.

Option C ('Both A and B'): Correct, as both intitle: and intext: can effectively identify directory listings, making this the most comprehensive answer.

Option D ('None of the above'): Incorrect, as both A and B are valid Google Dorks for this purpose.

The correct answer is C, aligning with the CAP syllabus under 'Reconnaissance Techniques' and 'Google Dorking.'

The request is a GET to /dashboard.php with a purl parameter (http://attacker.com). The response is a 302 Found redirect with a Location: http://attacker.com header, indicating the server redirects the client to the URL specified in the purl parameter. Let's evaluate the statements:

Option A ('Application is likely to be vulnerable to Open Redirection vulnerability'): Correct. Open Redirection occurs when an application redirects to a user-supplied URL without validation. Here, the purl parameter (http://attacker.com) is directly used in the Location header, allowing an attacker to redirect users to a malicious site (e.g., for phishing). This is a classic Open Redirection vulnerability if the application does not restrict redirects to trusted domains.

Option B ('Application is vulnerable to Cross-Site Request Forgery vulnerability'): Incorrect. CSRF involves tricking a user into making an unintended request (e.g., via a malicious form). This response does not indicate a CSRF issue; there's no evidence of state-changing actions or lack of CSRF tokens.

Option C ('Application uses an insecure protocol'): Incorrect. The request is made over HTTP, and the redirect is to an HTTP URL (http://attacker.com), which is insecure, but the response itself does not indicate the protocol used for the initial request. The server could be using HTTPS for the initial response; the insecure protocol is in the redirect destination, which relates to the Open Redirection issue, not the application's protocol usage broadly.

Option D ('All of the above'): Incorrect, as only A is true.

The correct answer is A, aligning with the CAP syllabus under 'Open Redirection Vulnerabilities' and 'URL Redirection Attacks.'

The password reset mechanism now includes a one-time random token alongside the userId in the reset link: https://example.com/reset_password?userId=5298&token=70e7803e-bf53-45e1-8a3f-fb15da7de3a0. Let's evaluate the effectiveness of this mechanism:

Analysis: The inclusion of a one-time random token (e.g., 70e7803e-bf53-45e1-8a3f-fb15da7de3a0) is a best practice for secure password reset mechanisms. This token should be unique, unpredictable, and tied to the specific user's reset request (e.g., stored in the database with an expiration time). When the user clicks the link, the application should verify that the token matches the one associated with the userId and that it hasn't been used or expired.

Preventing Arbitrary Resets: Without the token, an attacker could manipulate the userId (e.g., to 5299) to reset another user's password (as seen in Question 45). However, with the token, the attacker would need to guess the correct token for the targeted userId, which is computationally infeasible if the token is sufficiently random (e.g., a UUID or cryptographically secure random string) and properly validated. This prevents unauthorized password resets.

Additional Considerations: The link uses https://, ensuring a secure channel (unlike Question 45). The message 'If the email exists...' prevents username enumeration, as discussed previously.

Option A ('True'): Correct, as the one-time random token, if implemented correctly (e.g., validated server-side, single-use, time-limited), prevents an attacker from resetting arbitrary users' passwords.

Option B ('False'): Incorrect, as the mechanism is secure with the token.

The correct answer is A, aligning with the CAP syllabus under 'Secure Password Reset' and 'Token-Based Authentication.'

SAML (Security Assertion Markup Language) is an open standard for exchanging authentication and authorization data between parties, particularly in the context of single sign-on (SSO). It is based on XML and is widely used to enable secure web-based authentication and authorization across different domains. The correct full form is Security Assertion Markup Language, where 'Assertion' refers to statements about a subject (e.g., identity, attributes), 'Markup' indicates the XML-based structure, and 'Language' denotes the defined syntax.

Option A ('Security Assertion Markup Language'): This is the correct and official full form of SAML as defined by OASIS (Organization for the Advancement of Structured Information Standards).

Option B ('Security Authorization Markup Language'): Incorrect, as 'Authorization' is not part of the acronym; SAML focuses on both authentication and authorization assertions.

Option C ('Security Assertion Management Language'): Incorrect, as 'Management' is not part of the acronym; SAML is about markup, not management.

Option D ('Secure Authentication Markup Language'): Incorrect, as 'Secure' is not part of the acronym, and SAML covers more than just authentication.

The correct answer is A, aligning with the CAP syllabus under 'Authentication and Authorization' and 'Single Sign-On (SSO) Standards.'

A safe password must adhere to security best practices, including sufficient length, complexity, and resistance to common attacks (e.g., brute force, dictionary attacks). Let's evaluate each option:

Option A ('Monday@123'): This password is weak because it combines a common word ('Monday') with a simple number and symbol pattern. It is vulnerable to dictionary attacks and does not meet complexity requirements (e.g., mixed case, special characters, and randomness).

Option B ('abcdef'): This is a sequence of letters with no numbers, special characters, or uppercase letters. It is extremely weak and easily guessable, making it unsafe.

Option C ('Sq0Jh819%ak'): This password is considered safe because it is at least 10 characters long, includes a mix of uppercase letters (S, J, H), lowercase letters (q, h, a, k), numbers (0, 8, 9, 1), and a special character (%). It lacks predictable patterns and meets modern password policy standards (e.g., NIST SP 800-63B recommends at least 8 characters with complexity).

Option D ('1234567890'): This is a simple numeric sequence, highly predictable, and vulnerable to brute-force attacks, making it unsafe.

The correct answer is C, as it aligns with secure password creation guidelines, a key topic in the CAP syllabus under 'Authentication Security' and 'Secure Coding Practices.'